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FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 (June 14, 2012)1
TORTS – NEGLIGENCE - PREMISES LIABILITY
CIVIL PROCEDURE – GENERAL VERDICT RULE
EVIDENCE – EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
Summary
The Court considered whether the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability,
under which the plaintiff does not have to prove defendant’s knowledge of a particular hazardous
condition if the plaintiff can prove that the nature of the defendant’s business tends to create a
substantial risk of the type of harm the plaintiff suffered, extends beyond the self-service context
to sit-down restaurants, and whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain
evidence.
Disposition/Outcome
Because the mode of operation approach is premised on the idea that business owners
should be held responsible for the risks that their choice to have customers serve themselves
creates, the Court concluded that the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability does not
apply to “sit-down” restaurants.

Factual and Procedural History
Respondent Debbie Giglio was on a date with Raymond Schefrel at Carmine’s Little Italy
(“Carmine’s”), a “sit-down” restaurant. Carmine’s was operated by appellant FGA, Inc., which
was owned by appellants Carmine and Ann M. Vento Revocable Trust. The Trust was FGA’s
landlord.
Giglio and Schefrel consumed four beers and two glasses of wine at Carmine’s before
Giglio fell on her way to the restroom. Giglio claimed to have slipped on a greasy or oily
substance. Schefrel did not see the fall, but corroborated that there was an oily substance on the
floor. Managers for Carmine’s stated that the floor was clean and Giglio fell without slipping.
Carmine’s surveillance cameras were inoperable the night in question.
After the fall, Giglio had various medical procedures performed on her back and neck,
and claimed future medical treatment would be needed in the future. Giglio filed suit against
FGA, Inc. and the Trust (collectively “FGA”), alleging negligence.
Before trial, the general manager of Carmine’s incorrectly testified at a PMK deposition
that FGA held a “nonrestricted” gaming license. At trial, the district court took notice of Nevada
Gaming Regulation 5.160, which requires entities with nonrestricted gaming licenses to maintain
video surveillance. However, the district court did not allow FGA to present evidence that FGA
in fact held a “restricted” gaming license.
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Giglio filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of her prior and subsequent accidents
and injuries because they were not causally related to the injuries sustained in the accident,
which the district court granted. The district court also granted Giglio’s motion in limine to
exclude evidence of her alcohol consumption on the night of the fall.
At close of Giglio’s evidence, FGA moved for judgment as a matter of law under NRCP
50(a), on the basis that the Trust, as mere landlord, could not be liable for the negligence of its
tenant. The motion was denied. The jury was subsequently instructed that FGA was negligent if
FGA or one of its employees (1) caused a foreign substance to be in the floor, (2) had actual or
constructive notice of the substance and failed to remedy, or (3) that notice was established from
a foreseeable condition based on the nature of the owner’s business, or mode of operation, such
as self-service, under the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability.2 The mode of
operation instruction was given over FGA’s objection. The jury found FGA 51 percent
negligent; however no interrogatories were given to the jury to indicate which theory of
negligence it based its determination on. FGA appealed.
Discussion
On appeal, FGA argued that (1) the district court abused its discretion by giving a mode
of operation instruction in a case involving a sit-down restaurant; (2) the district court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence of Giglio’s preexisting injuries, evidence of alcohol
consumption, and evidence to clarify the applicability of a gaming regulation; and (3) the district
court erred by denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Mode of Operation Jury Instruction
A. General Verdict Rule
As a preliminary matter, the Court first determined that FGA’s mode of operation
argument on appeal was not rendered moot by the general verdict rule. The general verdict rule
provides that if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests
interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the
prevailing party.”3
In this case, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Connecticut courts and held that the
general verdict rule is inapplicable in cases where overlapping factual theories support a single
theory of recovery. Therefore, although Giglio alleged alternate factual theories of negligent
conduct, she raised only one theory of recovery—negligence. The general verdict rule does not
apply in situations where a jury renders a verdict on a single negligence claim that is premised on
multiple factual theories, therefore FGA’s mode of operation argument was not moot on appeal.
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B. Applicability of a “Mode of Operation” Instruction
FGA argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury
on mode of operation liability because mode of operation liability only applies in the context of
self-service operations. The Court reviewed the jury instruction for an abuse of discretion or
judicial error.5
Traditionally, where a substance causing a slip and fall results from “the actions of
persons other than the business or its employees, the business will only be liable if it had actual
or constructive notice of the condition and failed to remedy it.”6 However, there is a modern
trend toward modifying this traditional approach to premises liability to accommodate newer
merchandising techniques, such as the shift from clerk-assisted to self-service operations.7
Under the mode of operation approach, if a customer who is performing a task traditionally
performed by employees negligently creates a hazardous condition, the owner is charged with
creating this condition just as the owner would be charged with the responsibility for negligent
acts of his employees because it was the owner’s choice of mode of operation that created the
risk.8
The Supreme Court of Nevada implicitly adopted the mode of operation approach in
Sprague, when it stated that even in the absence of constructive notice, a jury could conclude that
a grocery store should have recognized the impossibility of keeping the produce section clean by
sweeping alone.9 However, Sprague dealt with a self-service section in a supermarket; therefore,
the Court did not address whether it would extend beyond self-service operations.
In this case,the Court held that mode of operation liability does not generally extend
beyond self-service operations to sit-down restaurants. Therefore, the Court held that the district
court abused its discretion by giving a mode of operation jury instruction in the context of a sitdown restaurant.
District Court Evidentiary Rulings
FGA argued that the district court erred by excluding evidence of Giglio’s preexisting
injuries, evidence of Giglio’s alcohol consumption, and the potential applicability of gaming
regulations to FGA. The Court reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion.10
A. Preexisting Back Condition
FGA argued that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Giglio’s
preexisting back condition.A preexisting injury may be relevant to the issues of causation and
5
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damages in a personal injury action.11 However, in order for evidence of a preexisting injury to
be admissible, a defendant must present by competent evidence a causal connection between the
prior injury and the injury at issue.12 Further, unless it is readily apparent to a layperson, the
defendant must generally produce expert testimony demonstrating the relationship between the
prior injury and the injury complained of, and why it is relevant to a fact of consequence. 13
In this case, none of FGA’s experts were able to testify to a reasonable degree of medical
probability that her preexisting condition caused the injuries at issue. Therefore, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence of Giglio’s preexisting back condition
because FGA’s expert testimony failed to meet the appropriate causation standard.
B. Alcohol Consumption
FGA argued that the district court erred by excluding evidence that Giglio and Schrefel
consumed alcohol prior to Giglio’s fall. Evidence of a party’s intoxication may be probative of
the issues of comparative negligence and causation.14 However, evidence of intoxication should
not be admitted if there is no causal link between the alleged intoxication and the injury.15
In this case, while there is conflicting testimony as to how many drinks Giglio consumed
prior to the fall, there is no evidence that Giglio showed signs of intoxication in the accident
report or medical records. Because there was insufficient evidence to show Giglio was
intoxicated at the time of the slip and fall, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding evidence of Giglio’s alcohol consumption.
However, the Court determined that the district court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence that Giglio’s key witness, Schrefel, consumed alcohol. Evidence of Schrefel’s alcohol
consumption was relevant to his ability to perceive the presence foreign substance on the floor
and should be admitted to assist the jury in determining Shrefel’s reliability as an eyewitness.
C. Nevada Gaming Regulation 5.160
FGA argued that the district court erred by taking judicial notice of Nevada Gaming
Regulation 5.160, which requires those establishments with a nonrestricted gaming license to
have operational surveillance cameras. FGA further argued that the district cour abused its
discretion by permitting Giglio to present evidence of the regulation while not permitting FGA to
present rebuttal evidence that the regulation did not apply to it because it only held a restricted
gaming license.
The general manager of Carmine’s incorrectly testified at a PMK deposition that FGA
held a “nonrestricted” gaming license. If true, this would have implicated FGA under Nevada
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Gaming Regulation 5.160 which requires nonrestricted gaming licensees to maintain operable
video surveillance.
Generally, the nature and extent that a party may present evidence to correct or change
testimony rests largely in the discretion of the district court.16 However, the Court stressed that
the legal system has an interest in seeking the truth and encourages the correction of erroneous
statements by a witness.17
At trial, FGA informed the court that the manager’s testimony was incorrect, and offered
both the testimony of the attorney who represented FGA before the Gaming Control Board and a
fax from the Gaming Control Board indicating that the license in question was a “restricted”
gaming license. The district court excluded this evidence and only allowed the testimony of one
of the holders of the license that the license was a restricted license. The court then permitted
Giglio to argue that FGA’s witnesses lacked credibility because they contradicted the manager’s
testimony and that there was no way to know what type of license FGA possesses because it was
never produced. The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in excluding
FGA’s evidence indicating that it, in fact, had a restricted license.18
Denial of the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law for appellant Carmine Vento and
Ann M. Vento Revocable Family Trust
FGA argued that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of
law as to the Trust because the Trust, as a mere landlord, could not be held liable for physical
harm caused by a dangerous condition on the premises. The Court reviewed of the denial of the
motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.19
Under Nevada law, a landlord is not liable for injury caused by the negligent actions of
its tenant.20 However, a landlord is still subject to the standard duty to exercise reasonable care
not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.21 The Court determined that the Trust, like
the landlord in Wright, was potentially liable for its own actions, but not liable solely based on its
status as a landlord.
In denying FGA’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the district court stated that
it was the jury’s “decision to make a determination as to whether or not the way [Carmine’s] was
set up from the mode of operation standpoint resulted in a potentially hazardous condition that
the property owner and the business owner or the FGA is responsible for.” However, because
the Court held that the mode of operation approach does not apply in the sit-down restaurant
context, the basis for the district court’s ruling was no longer valid. Therefore, the Court vacated
the district court’s order denying judgment as a matter of law and remanded to the district court
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for a determination whether Giglio presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find the Trust
liable based on its own conduct.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by giving a mode of
operation jury instruction in the context of a sit-down restaurant. The Court further concluded
that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a witness’ alcohol
consumption prior to a slip and fall and that the district court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence to rectify incorrect deposition testimony. Reversed and remanded.

